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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter aims to examine vulnerability in Australia’s critical infrastructure assets and 
examine to what extent cyber-criminals or cyber-terrorists2 are able to manipulate or exploit 
weaknesses in the protection of these crucial services. Critical infrastructure is defined, 
followed by a consideration of the threats to the critical information infrastructure. The focus 
is on information communication technology (ICT) and the effectiveness of existing and 
potential countermeasures. Comprehensive Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
(CIIP) planning processes have now been produced by many countries and best practices 
have emerged. The Crisis and Risk Network (CRN) CIIP Handbook and the situation reports 
of MELANI (the Swiss Agency ‘Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance) 
are good examples of the work being done. Significant problems remain in the evaluation and 
assessment of the integrity of these approaches in practice. Greater attention to potential 
weaknesses in SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems and rigorous 
penetration testing is required to ensure resilience in key critical infrastructure.  Coupled 
with high costs to private businesses a lack of follow-through, poor continuity and co-
ordination plus shallow or incomplete adoption of countermeasures have been cited as major 
problems in developing a resilient CIIP capacity. 
 
Introduction 
 
Parallels are also drawn between social engineering (Chapter 3) and the problems faced in 
critical infrastructure protection. Social engineering methods support cyber-crime through the 
collection of sensitive information via traditional or novel methods of deception. Examples of 
attacks on the critical infrastructure networks will be described and lessons learnt (but often 
not acted upon) from the vulnerabilities exposed discussed. The absence of suitable training 
and inappropriate safety cultures appears to be a major challenge and includes all sectors, 
private, governmental and household.  The importance and role of basic (and advanced) 
information security has been eroded by a combination of factors, notably poor software 
information security design, consumer complacency and over-reliance on technological fixes 
or patches. Private companies responsible for the majority of the critical infrastructure are a 
major potential vector for cyber-terrorism and crime but growing concern is warranted over 
networked computers in any context (for e.g. households, education institutions) due to the 
emergence of ‘botnets’ and other network oriented malware. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
                                                 
1 Contact address a.chantler@qut.edu.au 
2 Terrorism here is defined as politically motivated attacks against the state. 
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A country’s critical infrastructure consists of those indispensable resources that are required 
for a country to conduct its day-today business. In its basic form those resources include 
power, telecommunications, financial services, transport, emergency services, water and 
public administration. 
 
Lewis (2006:3), from an American perspective, suggests that today’s updated definition of 
critical infrastructure includes eleven sectors and five assets. This definition has grown out of 
an earlier definition that included only five sectors and is likely to expand even further over 
the next decade. According to the national (US) strategy, critical infrastructure and key assets 
encompass the following sectors: 
• Agriculture and food 
• Water 
• Public health 
• Emergency services 
• Defense industrial base 
• Telecommunications 
• Energy 
• Transportation 
• Banking and finance 
• Chemicals and hazardous materials 
• Postal and shipping 
 
The key assets are as follows: 
 
• National monuments and icons  
• Nuclear power plants 
• Dams 
• Government facilities (offices and governmental departments) 
• Commercial key assets (major skyscrapers) 
 
All of these resources and their functions have become increasingly dependant through 
information and communications technologies (ICT); and in particular, through the continued 
increase in the use of cable and wireless networks. Supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) is used on many systems for gathering and analysing real-time data. Originally 
developed in the late 1960s, SCADA systems are used to monitor and control a plant or 
equipment in industries such as electricity, telecommunications, water, effluent control, 
energy, oil and gas refining, global positioning systems and transportation.  
 
A significant threat from terrorism has been frequently cited since the events of 9/11, however, 
asymmetric warfare and information warfare has long been the concern of military and 
national security agencies of all ilk. What has changed in the last decade has been the rapid 
global expansion and convergence of ICT and its uptake on a large scale among developing 
nations (Broadhurst & Chantler 2006). Some of these developing nations may have elements 
among them hostile toward Australia and its allies. Equally important are the relative 
weakness of these nations law enforcement agencies and the emergence of  potential ‘safe 
havens’ in jurisdictions that are beyond the reach of the law. While bi-lateral efforts at co-
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operation have become essential in IT security3 multi-lateral and regional arrangements are in 
their infancy. Consequently an international response has been required and is now rapidly 
developing into practical forms of mutual legal assistance (MLA). 
 
                                                 
3 US-Japan CIIP cooperation developed 2003-04 is a good example of this bi-lateral form and is driven largely 
by economic rather than military concerns (see http//www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/39217, visited November 29, 
2006). 
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THE THREATS & RISKS TO CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
It is important to recognise that even today, with advances in technology, there are new 
threats that pose additional risks to our critical infrastructure. Even the mere lag of the 
development and application of legislation, behind the new technologies that are applied to 
the Internet, may open a window-of-opportunity for a hacker or cyber terrorist to take 
advantage. The following list provides further risks to critical information infrastructure that 
are intimately involved with ICT. These may also provide a cover for criminal and terrorist 
activities in attacking an ICT system. 
 
• Accidents, unintentional or intentional can disrupt information operations. A 
vehicle hitting and bringing-down a power pole or telephone pole may isolate 
users from power or communications. 
• Changes in the weather patterns can create changes in the upper atmosphere and 
affect the reliability of high-frequency and satellite communications. Thunder 
storms may provide ‘legitimate’ disruptions from lightening strikes and power 
surges that isolate users from part of the power-grid system. 
• The EMP (electro magnetic pulse) was regarded as something only found within 
the military domain. Small equipment (briefcase size) is available that can cause a 
localised pulse into a company’s property. ‘Swedish Army tests created EMP 
guns from openly available materials that could permanently damage cars at 30m 
and stop their engines at 90m’ (Clark 2002).  
• The failure of third-party dependence perhaps dues to industrial unrest; a support 
company (a service supplier) going into liquidation; changes in government 
legislation; unavailability of raw materials; political pressure and export/import 
embargoes may all affect information operations. 
• Sabotage from terrorist, issue motivated groups and political motivated groups. 
• Poor quality equipment leading to a hardware failure. The concept of what was 
once standard practice, of guaranteeing that equipment would work for a certain 
period of time, is no longer considered appropriate. In the past equipment was 
graded on its MTBF (mean time between failure), which meant that you could run 
it for a certain period of time without expecting any problems. 
• Incompatibility issues in hardware and software, along with the incomplete testing 
of information systems have lead to some dramatic accidents. An airshow display 
for the European Airbus provided a situation that was untested during flight trials. 
As the Airbus made a low pass, the pilots pulled-up its nose to climb away under 
full-power; the onboard computer stated that no additional power was available as 
they were in the landing configuration on final touchdown. This software fault 
resulted in the loss of two test pilots and the Airbus. 
• Incomplete insurance cover that does not take account of the new ICT; for 
example, part of which has since become a dependency-embedded critical asset 
into the business operations of a corporation. 
• Criminal activity in the form of illegal access, theft of assets, theft of service and 
manipulation of data. 
• Internal errors to an organisation such as employees ‘mistakes’, accidents and 
misuse or abuse of ICT assets. Changes in the core values and attributes of the 
‘new’ X and Y generations may lead to less due care and attention leading to an 
increase in risks in the way ICT assets are utilised. 
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• Over-loading and the over-extending of existing piggy-backed ICT systems 
causing severe interference to other services. The new developments of 
Broadband over Powerlines (BPL), is already documented in causing severe 
interference to other telecommunications services (Linton 2006:22-24). There is 
also potential to interfere with other SCADA (supervisory control and data 
acquisition) and similar services. 
 
Given the long standing nature of the problem of infrastructure protection a number of 
strategies have evolved to provide for a comprehensive approach to CIIP, including 
Australian efforts to provide for high level co-ordination of planning, training, intelligence 
and emergency responses similar to that undertaken by the FBI’s Infraguard programme via 
the Attorney-General’s Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) approach (Rothery 
2005).  
 
Comprehensive Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) planning process and 
best practices have now been produced by many advanced countries. TCRN CIIP Handbook 
and the situation reports of MELANI (the Swiss Agency ‘Reporting and Analysis Centre for 
Information Assurance) are good examples of the work being done4. The most recent report 
from MELANI for the period January-June 2006 addresses the international situation under 
several key headings: threats and risks; general trends, current lists of crimes and breakdowns, 
prevention software and hardware developments, current activities by international and 
national agencies, and legal developments. MELANI also undertakes surveys of information 
security among corporations and thus provides some assessment of the readiness of industry 
to respond the challenges of CIIP.  The relevant Australian agencies would benefit 
significantly by adopting and adding value to these forms of current ‘situational reporting’. 
 
In 20035 the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) reported on the CIP efforts of 
the financial services sector to address threats directed and this sector. The financial services 
sector is as vital a sector as energy, water, and transport and is also reliant on reliable ICT. 
The sector however is traditionally reluctant to share information generally and this includes 
both the experience and assessment of risk. The GAO report sought to understand the kinds of 
cyber threats faced and assess the sectors response at the industry and government 
partnerships level (in this case the US Department of Treasury). The USGAO (2003:2) report 
concluded that “The types of cyber threats that the financial services sector faces are similar 
to those faced by other critical infrastructure sectors: attacks from individuals and groups with 
malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism, and foreign intelligence”. Cyber-incidents are 
common in the financial services sector and are vulnerable because of the reliance on other 
critical infrastructure such as power and telecommunications. Attempts to develop detailed 
responses and plans to cyber threats were still undeveloped in the sector in the US and this 
reflect the situation in Australia were the Australian Bankers Association has stressed its 
dependency on power and ICT infrastructure (see also Australian Federal Parliaments’, 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission – ‘Cybercrime’, March 
2004). 
                                                 
4 An interesting feature is an attempt to clearly define the relevant phenomena in a uniform way – this enables a 
common language to emerge despite the constant inventions of new terms for essentially similar phenomena. 
5 Report to the Sub-committee on Domestic Monetary Policy, Technology and Economic Growth, Committee on 
Financial Services, house of Reps, US Congress, January, 2003 (GAO-03-173). See also Critical Foundations: 
Protecting America’s Infrastructures, Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure, 1997. 
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CYBER-TERRORISM & INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
 
One of the aims of cyber-terrorism6 is discredit governments by negatively impacting on 
critical infrastructure through incapacitation, exploitation or attempts at destroying or 
disruption of essential services such as the water systems, sewage lines, electricity grids, 
transport systems, communication systems or disrupting, electronic commerce, banking and 
food distribution (Cyber Security Journal 2006). This is done so that the terrorists may 
“threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken the economy and damage public 
morale and confidence” (Cyber Security Journal 2006). Attacks on critical infrastructure 
networks via cyberspace have become an attractive option to many hackers and terrorists. The 
lack of a physical barrier in cyber space enables them to attack from any corner of the globe 
causing maximum damage to a maximum number of people (Elmusharaf 2004). The identity 
and location of the hacker/terrorist can be easily hidden by complicating their internet trail. 
This can be done by accessing sites and initiating attacks from compromised computers (e.g. 
bot-nets). Malware may be used to collect sensitive information to achieve these aims. The 
threat of a digital Pearl Harbour (Lemos 2002) has helped to perpetuate these concerns and as 
a result the vulnerability of the USA’s critical infrastructure has come under scrutiny.  
 
Critical infrastructure protection is defined as the strategies, policies, and preparedness needed 
to protect, prevent, and when necessary, respond to a tax on these sectors and key assets 
(Lewis 2006:4) 
 
The definition of critical infrastructure is evolving, and so is the strategy for protecting the 
area sectors that make up critical infrastructure.  What is the national state, city and local 
government strategy for protection of these vital systems and services? Are these strategies 
adequate?  
 
Protection includes those basics associated with ‘key-point security’ physical security, 
personnel security, materiel security, ICT/cyber security, emergency preparedness and 
response, business continuity planning, testing and recovery from a catastrophic event, with 
emphasis on deterring, preventing, limiting, and recovering from attacks.  
 
The vulnerability of the critical network infrastructure is further heightened due to the fact 
that more than 80% of these networks are managed in the USA by private companies, who are 
believed, in the majority of cases, to be lacking adequate education about information safety 
(Golubev 2003). Knowledge about these procedures is crucial as it prepares the company for 
social engineering attacks and other forms of attempted theft of sensitive information. A 
popular example of a successful attack against critical infrastructure is Nimda (‘admin’ spelt 
backwards), a worm that resulted in a $3 billion loss to companies linked to the net. The “I 
Love You”, “Melissa” and “Code Red” viruses further resulted in hundreds of millions dollars 
in damage. Tactical exercises executed for the purpose of determining the likelihood of a 
successful attack against the critical infrastructure networks indicated that a cyber assault is 
more than capable of dismantling the communications system of a heavily populated area 
(Golubev 2003). 
 
Previous attacks against the USA’s critical network infrastructure seem to suggest that there is 
a significant gap in the protection of such organisations.  
                                                 
6 Criminals have also chosen to attack national ‘critical’ infrastructure but more typically attack the cores aspects 
of businesses (client identification, services & financial systems) in order to steal, deceive or blackmail victims. 
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¾ 1997, Florida reported an attack by a hacker in Sweden that jammed the emergency 911 
telephone service 
¾ 1997, a hacker disabled the computer system of a airport control tower in Worcester 
¾ 1998, the computer systems of the NASA, Navy and Department of Defense were 
attacked 
¾ 2000, a hacker redirected millions of gallons of sewage into the town of Maroochy Shire. 
¾ 2000, a hacker in Russia managed to gain control of the computer system that controlled 
the flow of natural gas 
¾ 2002, A distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack disabled 9 of the 13 root servers 
who’s primary purpose are to be road-maps for all Internet communication.  
(Elmusharaf 2004) 
* A list of some recent cyber attacks on oil companies can be located at the “Report on 
Securing Critical Oil Infrastructure From Cyber Threats” website. 
 
Computers accessed by members of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan have revealed that the terrorist 
group was interested in, and were found to be collecting information about America’s critical 
infrastructure. This included water, communication and energy systems (Elmusharaf 2004). 
There have also been reports that Al-Qaeda have attempted to attack America’s power grids 
as well as the obvious attacks on transportation and financial institutions (Elmusharaf 2004). 
These previous attempts at destroying, incapacitating and manipulating different areas of 
critical infrastructure seem to suggest that there is a considerable gap in the protection of such 
networks. The result of such attacks could potentially have as serious of an impact as a 
physical attack. This may be because modern society depends on these infrastructural 
elements and a cyber assault on these networks can be seen as the “electronic equivalent of 
total war” (Cant 2004).  
 
As stated by the US President’s assistant for national security, Dr. Rice “every field of the 
national economy including power engineering, transport, communication and banking sector 
uses computer networks and depends on their efficiency. Their failure can paralyse the entire 
country” (Golubev unknown). However, there seems to be much scepticism about the 
magnitude of such attacks without additional physical attacks and insider assistance (Mi2g 
Intelligence Unit 2004). Insider assistance is generally possible due to any unhappy company 
employee. This is perceived to be the most common, primary source of cyber-crime (Cyber 
Security Journal 2006). However insider assistance may also be obtained involuntarily when 
an individual accidentally installs malware (malicious software) into the company’s computer 
system.  
 
It has been suggested that terrorists may utilise high-tech crime in conjunction with a physical 
assault in order to intensify the effect of the attack. For example, a repeat of a 9/11 type attack 
would be destructive enough, however coupled with an attack similar to that of Florida 1997, 
jamming of the emergency 911 service, would create even further chaos and disruption in 
accordance with the terrorist’s aims. This scenario could potentially have one of the most 
devastating and debilitating effects on a nation’s economic sector and would result in more 
casualties and heightened public panic (USGAO 2003, 9). 
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SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
 
The use of malware and social engineering techniques is still considered to be one of the 
primary methods of obtaining sensitive information for the use of cyber-terrorism. Trojan 
horses may be used to install a keylogger programme which can record usernames and 
passwords and transmit this information to a third party. Also by using the back door access 
of a trojan horse, residential computers may be used in a Level 1 attack (see ‘Vulnerabilities 
in Critical Infrastructure Networks’) by installing a bot-net. In conjunction with other 
compromised residential computer systems, a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack can 
be mounted against a critical infrastructure sector in an attempt to overload of the targeted 
computer system. 
 
While it may be possible for social engineering and hacking techniques to be used to assist in 
the attacking of critical infrastructure, it is necessary to establish that some software that is 
used for retrieval of personal information may not be dangerous. Adware (a term referring to 
‘advertisement’ and ‘software’) has generally been classified as a separate, non-malicious 
form of software (Panda Software International 2005:29). Though adware may – similarly to 
malware – transmit data to a third party (via the use of enabled ‘cookies’) (Bazeley 2003), this 
data is generally only  marketing information about the user’s shopping and browsing habits, 
rather than passwords and usernames (O’Connell 2005).  
 
This form of software allows the owner of the adware to utilise a surfer’s Internet Protocol 
Address to receive information about the user. This includes the computer operating system 
and monitor that is being used by the web surfer, the geographical location of that same 
computer and the web sites that were visited before and after the owner of the adware’s 
website. In doing so, the owner of the adware is able to formulate a profile of the web user’s 
shopping habits (Bazeley 2003). Offline information such as credit reports may also be 
merged with this personal profile in order to create personalised adware such as pop-ups 
(Bazeley 2003). For example, if a user is browsing an online website about flights to a 
particular destination, they may be bombarded with pop-ups of discount flights to that area. 
Research indicated that on average approximately three out of every 97 pop-ups are clicked 
on. Furthermore, adware has been estimated to represent 25 percent of the current online 
advertising trade (Computer Crime Research Center 2005).  
 
There also seems to be a growing trend towards more sophisticated methods of tracking 
customer behaviour. It has been reported that one company, TACODA Systems Inc will 
perform an experiment where web surfers are connected to brain scanners and shown a 
variety of online ads to determine which ads and what placement more effectively registers in 
their brain activity (Baker and Hempel 2006). Also, customers will soon be offered the chance 
to receive discounts via a ‘loyalty card’ benefits system where information about their 
consumer habits will be exchanged for these shopping discounts. Behavioural targeting is 
expected to grow and flourish within the next few years. This form of consumer tracking 
allows cookies to attach themselves to a computer system and follow them to the web sites 
that they visit after enabling the cookie. Using this data, the computer is able to deduce what 
the web surfer is interested in buying. Then, when the individual is looking at a site unrelated 
to their main interest, an ad will pop-up. This is done as it has been reported that 
advertisements on an unrelated site attract greater interest (up to 17% more) (Baker and 
Hempel 2006).  
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There is much debate about whether adware can be classified as malware. The discreet nature 
of the installation of adware suggests that this form of software lends itself more to use as 
malware or spyware than promotional software (Panda Software International 2005:30). 
Adware is considered by some to be “a serious threat to the future of internet 
communications” (Center for Democracy and Technology 2006:1). Web surfers are rarely 
aware that they have downloaded adware and it is believed that if they did, they would be less 
than content about having adware on their personal computer (Elgin 2004). It is common for a 
web surfer to be tricked into downloading products containing adware by entering a website 
and then being confronted by a ‘warning’ pop up and the security of their computer. These 
ads are generally for spyware removal or free scans of their computer for viruses (Elgin 2004). 
The tendency of this software to cause technical problems with the computer systems also 
renders it disruptive and a nuisance to the operator. These technical problems can include 
excessive pop-ups and a slower transfer rate (Center for Democracy and Technology 2006, 1). 
 
VULNERABILITIES IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS 
 
Remote-control processes are used in almost every kind of industry. Application is not limited 
to critical infrastructure sector processes. Widespread adoption is driven by efficiencies and 
economies. Automation reduces labour costs and decreases reaction time. But SCADA is 
fundamentally at risk because it is an information technology that has ignored security for 
decades (Lewis 2006:228). 
 
The terms SCADA and ‘distributed control system’ (DCS) are often used interchangeably, but 
SCADA is usually reserved for systems that are geographically dispersed. SCADA systems 
typically rely on communication networks to connect to remote terminal units (RTUs) to the 
MTU; (Lewis 2006:223) whereas a DCS tends to be more-often local or ‘on-site’.  
 
SCADA is defined as: 
 
‘an industrial management and control system consisting of a central host or master.  
(usually called master station, master terminal unit or MTU); one or more field data 
gathering and control units or remotes  (usually called remote stations, remote terminal units 
or RTU’s ); and collection of standard and/or custom software used to monitor and control 
remotely located field data elements.  Contemporary SCADA systems exhibit predominantly 
open-loop control characteristics and utilize predominantly long-distance communications, 
although some elements of closed-loop control and/or short distance communications may be 
present.’7
 
A SCADA system gathers information, such as where a leak on a pipeline has occurred, 
transfers the information back to a central site, alerting the home station that the leak has 
occurred, carrying out necessary analysis and control, such as determining if the leak is 
critical, and displaying the information in a logical and organized fashion. SCADA systems 
can be relatively simple, such as one that monitors environmental conditions of a small river, 
an office building; or, something complex, such as a system that monitors all the activity in a 
nuclear power plant. 8
                                                 
7 http://www.sss-mag.com/glossary/page4.html 
8 http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SCADA.html
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‘Paul Blomgren […] measures (SCADA) control system vulnerabilities. Last year, his 
company assessed a large southwestern utility that serves about four million customers.“ Our 
people drove to a remote substation," he recalled. "Without leaving their vehicle, they noticed 
a wireless network antenna. They plugged in their wireless LAN cards, fired up their 
notebook computers, and connected to the system within five minutes because it wasn't using 
passwords. […] Within 15 minutes, they mapped every piece of equipment in the operational 
control network. Within 20 minutes, they were talking to the business network and had pulled 
off several business reports.’ 9
 
Vulnerabilities can exist due to poor or non-existent security measures surrounding the 
computer systems and technological failures which create opportunities for hackers and 
terrorists to obtain access (Department of Homeland Security 2003:3). These vulnerabilities 
can be divided into five stages.  
 
Level 1 – Home user/ small business 
¾ These computers can be controlled through the use of bot-nets to launch DDOS attacks at 
critical infrastructure 
Level 2 – Large enterprises 
¾ Common targets for cyber attacks (malware) as they are usually linked to critical 
infrastructure.  
Level 3 – Critical sectors/infrastructures 
¾ “Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual so vital [to the United States] that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
of those matters”. 
(USA Patriot Act cited in Shea 2003:1) 
Level 4 – National issues/vulnerabilities  
¾ Some attacks at individual critical infrastructure networks may cause a national effect as 
all sectors are linked to the internet. Weaknesses in the security networks are contributes 
to this level vulnerability. 
Level 5 – Global 
¾ The interconnectedness of the computers internationally sometimes means that when one 
country has experienced a cyber assault of some sort, other connected computers 
(including international) may also be affected 
(Department of Homeland Security 2003:8) 
 
This failure may already exist within the computer system or may be created by a hacker by 
manoeuvring around a weak security program. This includes inadequate training for staff 
against social engineering attacks (HUMINT – human intelligence) and an understanding of 
the manner in which harmful software may be installed into the computer system (e.g. 
downloading, installing). Failure to install adequate security programs also magnifies this risk 
(Department of Homeland Security 2003:11-12). Therefore a lack of understanding about 
cyber-security awareness creates vulnerabilities and subsequent opportunities for hackers and 
or cyber terrorists. It is necessary to educate the employees of the private companies that 
manage the critical infrastructure networks. 
 
                                                 
9 http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/dec02/features/scadavs/scadavs.html 
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The sophistication of the technology used to perform these attacks also creates an ongoing 
problem (Department of Homeland Security 2003:6). The methodologies of cyber-terrorism 
are becoming more well-known and every time a company creates an anti-virus program to 
safeguard a computer system against these viruses, hackers will create new techniques to 
combat this security measures. Cyberspace has essentially assisted terrorism by creating 
opportunities for hacker and terrorists to attack the weakest points of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure (Department of Homeland Security 2003:7). As aforementioned, this could be 
utilised to tamper with emergency services in conjunction with a physical attack to achieve 
maximum devastation.  
 
Remote controlled systems such as SCADA, and its pervasiveness throughout many 
industries is now a recognised vulnerability because of its intimate connection to 
infrastructure. The Department of Energy (USA) promotes ‘21 steps to SCADA Security’10: 
 
1. Identify all connections to SCADA networks. 
2. Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network 
3. Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA 
network 
4. Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services 
5. Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system 
6. Implement the security features provided by device and systems vendors 
7. Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA 
network 
8. Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24 x 7 
monitoring 
9. Perform technical audits of SCADA devices and networks and any connected 
networks to identify security concerns 
10. Conduct physical security surveys and assess all remote sites connected to the 
SCADA network to evaluate their security 
11. Establish SCADA “Red Teams” to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios 
12. Clearly define cyber-security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers, 
systems administrators and users 
13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions or 
contain sensitive information that require additional protection 
14. Establish a ongoing risk management process 
15. Establish a network protection strategy based on a principle of defense in depth 
16. Clearly identify cyber-security requirements 
17. Establish a effective configuration management process 
18. Conduct routine self assessments 
19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans 
20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber-security 
performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance 
21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational 
personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information regarding SCADA system 
design, operations or security controls. 
 
                                                 
10 www.utc.org/?v2_group=0&p=3629 
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The Report on Securing Critical Oil Infrastructure From Cyber Threats highlights several 
vulnerabilities in the information technology (I.T.) systems: 
 
 
Shared or Joint Use Systems 
¾ By creating shared or joint use e-commerce systems, the security of the entire 
infrastructure is vulnerable. A failure of any part of these systems can create a significant 
security breach within the network. 
 
Foreign Access 
¾ The merging of multi-national organisations means that there is a heightened risk of 
vulnerability in the infrastructure network due to foreign companies being granted access 
to these networks. An increase in the number of individuals allowed access to the 
established infrastructure signify’s increased opportunity for vulnerabilities. 
 
Remote Access and Detachment from Consequences 
¾ The ability of a hacker/terrorist to attack at any time, from anywhere, has made it 
increasingly difficult to track the hacker/terrorist. Therefore the increasing usage of 
computer systems in regard to process control has resulted in complex computer systems 
with increased vulnerabilities. 
 
Security Features and Interfaces 
¾ Inadequate security features and interfaces create vulnerabilities not only in the software, 
but also the computer system which the software is used on. Coupled with lax information 
security procedures creates a significant security risk. Furthermore, other computer 
systems which are connected to the compromised computer system are also vulnerable. 
 
Outsourcing 
¾ Inevitable employees will become familiar with the weaknesses (back doors, program 
flaws) of the computer system utilised by their company. Therefore there is a risk that this 
information will be misused. 
(Nagpal, Nayak and Sharma 2004) 
 
WHY THERE HASN’T BEEN A FULL-SCALE CYBER ASSAULT? 
 
While there have been many attempted (and sometimes successful) attacks on the critical 
infrastructure, there has not yet been any known cyber assault on the critical infrastructure of 
a truly crippling nature. So why, if many academics believe this scenario is not hypothetical, 
but potentially a reality, has there not been a full-scale assault on the critical infrastructure? 
There are a variety of explanations for this lack of debilitating action.  
 
It has been suggested that cyber-terrorism is still considered to be a novelty (Reno 2003). Also, 
it is believed that there have not been any known major cyber assaults due to the sophisticated 
nature of the technical skills and capabilities required to mount such an organised attack 
(Department of Homeland Security 2003:8). However while it is relatively easy to mount a 
common, unsophisticated attack on the critical infrastructure through the use of DDOS or 
malware, which could possibly cause large-scale damage, terrorists would need to employ 
insider assistance. Thus it is believed that one of the explanations for the lack of full scale 
attacks may be a result of the terrorist’s unwillingness to commit more than the minimum 
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resources required to achieve their aims (Mi2g Intelligence Unit 2004). Furthermore, terrorists 
are more inclined to use tried and tested methods that are practically guaranteed a notable 
result. 
 
Others suggest that computer software that is now being released makes it seemingly simple 
for a computer literate teenager to send trojan horses in an attempt to obtain a back-door entry 
to an organisation’s computer system, and that rather the computer security control boards 
that protect the major organisations interrupt the most harmful attacks on the computer 
systems before they reach their destination. It may be proposed that the lack of concern by the 
companies responsible for the domestic critical infrastructure networks may be due to the lack 
of successful major assaults in the recent past. In circumstances when hackers have managed 
to obtain access to these computer systems, most representatives maintain that the harm 
caused was minimal (Shea 2003:6).  
 
“Unfamiliar and uncommon commands used in legacy industrial control systems will 
continue to provide as high a barrier to future destructive attempts as it has in the past” (Shea 
2003:6). A full-scale attack on the nation’s critical infrastructure is deemed to be of lower-
probability but may be achieved through a synergistic or cascade effect (Shea 2003:6). While 
contradicting views about the probability of a large-scale attack on the nation’s critical 
infrastructure within the near future are noted, previous attempts that have resulted in 
damaging, though not devastating effects seem to suggest that there is a great likelihood of a 
significant attack being attempted within the foreseeable future. However there is no evidence 
to suggest that the magnitude of the threat will be of such a scale as to threaten the very core 
of a nation’s critical infrastructure. 
 
CYBERCRIME OFFENCES & INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Although there is no definitive list of what constitutes cybercrime or computer related crime a 
consensus has emerged about what falls within the scope of the offences that occur in 
cyberspace. Some of these offences have a role to play in threats toward critical infra-
structure assets. 
 
• Telecommunications Theft 
• Illegal Interception of Telecommunications 
• Theft of Intellectual Property (Piracy) 
• Electronic money laundering and Tax evasion 
• Electronic Vandalism, Cyber-Terrorism, Denial of Service, Extortion 
• Sales and Investment Fraud, Forgery (Classic Pyramid schemes) 
• Electronic Funds Transfer Fraud and Counterfeiting (Carding) 
• Identity Theft and Misrepresentation  
• Content Crime - Offensive Materials 
• Espionage 
• Resource Theft 
  
Hence as we can see from the above list cybercrime ranges across a wide spectrum of 
activities and behaviours. At one end are crimes that involve fundamental breaches of 
personal or corporate privacy, such as assaults on the integrity of information held in digital 
depositories and the use of illegally obtained digital information to blackmail a firm or 
individual. Also at this end of the spectrum is the growing crime of identity theft. Midway 
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along the spectrum are transaction-based crimes such as fraud, trafficking in child 
pornography, digital piracy, money laundering, and counterfeiting. These are specific crimes 
with specific victims, but the criminal hides in the relative anonymity provided by the Internet. 
Another aspect of this type of crime involves individuals within corporations or government 
bureaucracies who deliberately alter data for either profit, personal or political objectives. At 
the other end of the spectrum are those crimes that involve attempts to disrupt the actual 
workings of the Internet. These range from spamming, hacking, and denial of service attacks 
against specific sites to acts of cyber-terrorism—that is, the use of the Internet to cause public 
disorder or disturbances and even death. Cyber-terrorism focuses upon the use of the Internet 
by non-state actors to affect a nation's economic and technological infrastructure. Since the 
September 11 attacks of 2001, public awareness of the threat of cyber-terrorism has grown 
dramatically.11  
 
In the following we briefly describe the various forms of cybercrime now extant, and their 
likely development and relevance to CIIP. 
Telecommunications Theft 
These groups of offences seek to exploit the vulnerabilities in ICT services provided by public 
or private telecommunications utilities tapping into someone’s phone line by splicing into a 
phone cable to enable ‘free’ calls to be made by the perpetrator - the calls being paid for by 
the legitimate owner. ‘Phone-phreakers’, who send ‘tones’ down the phone line to be able to 
get long-distance ‘trunk’ access at a telephone exchange, enabling free phone calls world-
wide is another form of telecommunications theft. They may also use a computer to dial into a 
company’s PBX (public branch exchange), then ‘hack’ the exchange to make long-distance 
calls for free, at the expense of the organization that owns the telephone exchange. They will 
also sell the call time accessed by their hacking to others. Theft of Internet access by 
commandeering someone else’s open (unsecured) wireless network is called ‘wardriving’. 
Here the perpetrator will drive around until they find an unsecured wireless network, where 
they can get free access at the expense of the legitimate owner. 
Illegal Interception of Telecommunications 
Developments in telecommunications provide new opportunities for electronic eavesdropping. 
From activities as time-honoured as surveillance of an unfaithful partner, to the newest forms 
of political and industrial espionage, telecommunications interception has numerous and 
enhanced applications. Again, technological developments create new vulnerabilities. The 
electromagnetic signals emitted by a computer may themselves be intercepted. Cables may act 
as broadcast antennas. Existing laws in Australia (and many other jurisdictions), however, do 
not prevent the remote monitoring of computer radiation.  
 
The illegal ‘tapping into’ telephone lines, cable and wireless networks are not only an 
invasion of privacy, but may lead to the theft of information. As Internet technology continues 
to develop, so does the opportunity to ‘watch’ and collect sensitive corporate and financial 
information. In short there is no limit to the demand for such activities. 
 
                                                 
11 Cybercrime 2006, Retrieved June 15, 2006, from Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service: 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-235699 
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Theft of Intellectual Property (Piracy) 
The opportunity for intellectual property offences and copyright theft are enhanced by the 
current advanced state of digital technology. Digital technology permits perfect reproduction 
and easy dissemination of print, graphics, sound, and multimedia combinations. Opportunities 
exist to reproduce copyrighted material for personal use, for sale at a lower price, or indeed, 
for free distribution.  
 
The unlawful downloading and sharing of software, films and music in the form of MP3s and 
other files is widespread. Even after the demise of Napster and a series of legal infringement 
suits brought by the American recording industry and IFPI against peer to peer networks 
including music-sharing individuals seemingly chosen at random. Promotional DVDs 
distributed by movie studios (often for consideration for awards) are a common source of 
unauthorised copying when movies are still not in theatrical release. Similar piracy occurs 
with computer games and business software. Movies are also still copied by someone 
sneaking a camcorder into a movie theater and secretly taping the projection (also known as 
"CAM"), although these products are less desirable and are more common in third world 
markets. The advent of broadband access and the latest compression technology has made 
downloading music video and other complex files fast and easy with a high cost for the 
industries involved. “The intellectual-property industry and law-enforcement officials 
estimate that U.S. companies lost as much as $250 billion per year to Internet pirates, (e.g. 
who swap for free digital copies of "The Da Vinci Code," Chamillionaire's latest album and 
the latest Grand Theft Auto video game).  Such entertainment and other copyright exports - 
worth about $626 billion annually, or 6 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product - are as 
important to today's American economy as autos, steel and coal were to yesterday's”.12  
Electronic Money Laundering and Tax Evasion 
The explosion of e-money technology raises a number of policy issues, one of which is 
money laundering. Any crime that generates significant profits - extortion, drug trafficking, 
arms smuggling and some kinds of white-collar crime - may involve attempts at money 
laundering. E-money is attractive to money launderers for two main reasons: electronic 
transactions may become untraceable and are incredibly mobile. E-money transactions can 
easily be anonymous and may not leave a traditional audit trail. E-money systems also offer 
instantaneous transfer of funds with effectively no jurisdictional restrictions. 
 
Similarly, a loss in revenue arising form unpaid taxes can occur during Internet financial 
transactions. This is because electronic transactions online are becoming increasingly difficult 
to monitor and record; furthermore, they may be out of the physical jurisdiction in an 
‘unreachable part of cyberspace’. 
Electronic Vandalism, Cyber-Terrorism, Extortion and Denial of Service 
The defacing of websites; causing computer systems to crash from a remote location; and, 
holding a country to ransom by threatening to bring down a country’s financial system; are all 
possible scenarios for vandalism, extortion and cyber-terrorism. 
As never before, western industrial society is dependent upon complex data processing and 
telecommunications systems. Damage to, or interference with, any of these systems can lead 
                                                 
12 Frank Ahrens, ‘Feds tackle music, movie piracy foreign file sharing ‘(19 June 2006)  
The Washington Post, see http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_3953117 
retrieved at June 18, 2006. 
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to catastrophic consequences. Whether motivated by curiosity or vindictiveness, electronic 
intruders cause inconvenience at best, and have the potential for inflicting massive harm. 
While this potential has yet to be realised, a number of individuals and protest groups have 
hacked the official web pages of various governmental and commercial organisations. This 
may also operate in reverse – state agencies seeking to disrupt protest group websites. An 
example of an organised hacking incident was apparently directed at a server which hosted in 
1999 the Internet domain for East Timor, which at the time was seeking its independence 
from Indonesia.  
Defence planners around the world are investing substantially in information warfare 
primarily as means of disrupting the information technology infrastructure of enemy defence 
systems. Attempts were made to disrupt the computer systems of the Sri Lankan Government 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the 1999 bombing of Belgrade. One case, 
which illustrates the trans-national reach of extortionists, involved a number of German 
hackers who compromised the system of an Internet service provider in South Florida, 
disabling eight of the ISPs ten servers. The offenders obtained personal information and credit 
card details of 10,000 subscribers, and, communicating via electronic mail through one of the 
compromised accounts, demanded that US$30,000 be delivered to a mail drop in Germany. 
Co-operation between US and German authorities resulted in the arrest of the extortionists 
(Bauer 1998 cited in Grabosky 2001). More recently, an extortionist in Eastern Europe 
obtained the credit card details of customers of a North American based on-line music retailer, 
and published some on the Internet when the retailer refused to comply with his demands.13  
A denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) is an attack on a computer system or network that 
causes a loss of service to users, typically the loss of network connectivity and services by 
consuming the bandwidth of the victim network or overloading the computer resources of the 
victim system. Various DoS-causing exploits can cause server-running software to get 
confused and fill the disk space or consume all available memory or CPU time. The following 
methods are commonly used in DoS attacks: 
  
• E-mail bombs (Spamming) 
An e-mail bomb is the sending of a massive amount of e-mail to a specific person or system. 
A huge amount of mail may simply fill up the recipient's disk space on the server or, in some 
cases, may be too much for a server to handle and may cause the server to stop functioning. In 
the past, mail bombs have been used to "punish" Internet users who have been egregious 
violators of netiquette (for example, people using e-mail for undesired advertising, or spam).  
Mail bombs not only inconvenience the intended target but they are also likely to 
inconvenience everybody using the server.  
 
• Pinging 
Ping is a computer network tool used to test whether a particular host is reachable across an IP 
network. Ping works by sending Internet Control Machine Protocol (ICMP) “echo request” 
packets to the target host and listening for ICMP “echo response” replies. Using interval 
timing and response rate, ping estimates the round-trip time and packet loss rate between 
hosts. 
                                                 
13 Examples found at http://www.crime.hku.hk/cybercrime.htm  
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• Invalid Packets 
A so called ‘nuke’ attack sends a packet, usually ICMP, which is malformed or fragmented in 
an invalid way, triggering a bug in the operating system and crashing the targeted computer. 
This is known as the ping of death. ‘WinNuke’ is a similar kind of attack, exploiting the 
vulnerability in the NetBIOS handler in Windows 95. A string of out-of-band data is sent to 
TCP port 139 of the victim machine, causing it to lock up and display a ‘Blue Screen of 
Death’. This attack was very popular between the Internet Relay Chat (IRC)-dwelling script 
kiddies, due to easy availability of a user-friendly click-and-crash WinNuke program. 
 
• Flooding 
Other kinds of DoS rely primarily on brute force, flooding the target with an overwhelming 
flux of packets, saturating its connection bandwidth or depleting the target's system resources. 
Bandwidth-saturating floods rely on the attacker having higher bandwidth available than the 
victim; a common way of achieving this today is via Distributed Denial of Service, employing 
a ‘botnet’ (see below). Other floods may use specific packet types or connection requests to 
saturate finite resources by, for example, occupying the maximum number of open 
connections or filling the victim's disk space with logs. Ping flood is based on sending the 
victim an overwhelming number of ping packets, usually using the "ping -f" command. It is 
very simple to launch, the primary requirement being access to greater bandwidth than the 
victim. 14
 
Sales and Investment Fraud, Forgery and Pyramid Schemes 
Since e-commerce has become prevalent, the application of digital technology to fraudulent 
endeavours is now commonplace. The use of the telephone for fraudulent sales pitches, 
deceptive charitable solicitations, or bogus investment overtures is increasingly common. 
Cyberspace now abounds with a wide variety of investment opportunities, from traditional 
securities such as stocks and bonds, to more exotic opportunities such as coconut farming, the 
sale and leaseback of automatic teller machines, and worldwide telephone lotteries. 
 
Websites look bone-fide, but how do you know they are valid sites? Criminals use them to 
‘phish’ - that is to collect sensitive personal data like credit card and bank account numbers - 
also get people to send money; ‘invest with them’; purchase goods that don’t exist and so on.  
Job opportunities to work from home, but the catch is, ‘we need your bank details’; and scams 
like the ‘Nigerian (419) Scams’ where you are suddenly the beneficiary for a large sum of 
money, but ‘we need your bank details’, or ‘we need you to pay us the bank fees so that we 
can release the funds to you’! The purchase and on-selling of items, which you never see, can 
be ‘virtual pyramid schemes’, where there was never any merchandise in the first place. 
 
Electronic Funds Transfer Fraud and Counterfeiting (Carding) 
Electronic funds transfer systems have begun to proliferate, and so has the risk that such 
transactions may be intercepted and diverted. Valid credit card numbers can be intercepted 
electronically, as well as physically; the digital information stored on a card can be 
counterfeited. 
  
For example, in 1994 a Russian hacker Vladimir Levin, operating from St Petersburg, 
accessed the computers of Citibank's central wire transfer department, and transferred funds 
                                                 
14 see for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dos_attack 
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from large corporate accounts to other accounts which had been opened by his accomplices in 
The United States, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, and Israel. Officials from one of the 
corporate victims, located in Argentina, notified the bank, and the suspect accounts, located in 
San Francisco, were frozen. The accomplice was arrested. Another accomplice was caught 
attempting to withdraw funds from an account in Rotterdam. Although Russian law precluded 
Levin's extradition, he was arrested during a visit to the United States and subsequently 
imprisoned (Denning 1999:55). 
 
The above forms of computer-related crime are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and need 
not occur in isolation. Just as an armed robber might steal an automobile to facilitate a quick 
getaway, so too can one steal telecommunications services and use them for purposes of 
vandalism, fraud, or in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy. Computer-related crime may be 
compound in nature, combining two or more of the generic forms outlined above15.  
 
Carding is the process of making bogus credit cards (counterfeiting) with real or fabricated 
numbers and identifiers, which pass as real. Payment card companies such as Amex, 
MasterCard, Visa and others are all at risk. Countries from the former Soviet Union seem to 
be the most active in carding. This probably is the most lucrative criminal activity on the 
Internet; though reliable figures of losses from credit card companies are hard to obtain. 
 
Credit card fraud is one of many forms of fraud on the Internet involving not only credit cards, 
but charge cards, debit cards, or prepaid cards. Credit card fraud is fraud that arises when a 
merchant (business, service provider, seller, etc.) is "tricked" into releasing merchandise or 
rendering services, believing that a credit card account will provide payment for 
goods/services. The merchant later learns that they will not be paid, or the payment they 
received will be reclaimed by the card's issuing bank. Typically, the fraudster causes a credit 
card of another person to be charged for a purchase. About half of all credit card fraud is now 
thought to be conducted online, meaning that the fraudsters make online purchases with the 
credit card details of other people.16
 
Identity Theft, Deception and Misrepresentation 
Identity theft involves the collection of data about individuals. There are many different ways 
that criminals collect your personal information; from rubbish bins; from security weaknesses 
in computer systems stealing databases of customer information; using social engineering – 
where they may make a pretext call to elicit key information from you; from making you 
believe that there is a formal request for you to ‘re-confirm your account information  
 
• Website Cloning 
It looks like a real website, but it’s not. You may have been directed to it from an email. Look 
closely at the address bar. It’s another attempt to get you to give your financial details; or 
perhaps sell you items from a website that looks valid, but is not. 
 
• Phishing 
Phishing is e-mail fraud where the perpetrator sends out legitimate-looking e-mails that 
pretend to come from well known and trustworthy Web sites in an attempt to gather personal 
and financial information from the recipient. A phishing expedition, like the fishing 
                                                 
15 http://www.crime.hku.hk/cybercrime.htm 
16  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_card_fraud 
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expedition it's named for, is a speculative venture: the phisher puts the lure hoping to fool at 
least a few of the prey that encounter the bait. Web sites that are frequently spoofed by 
phishers include PayPal, eBay, MSN, Yahoo, BestBuy, and America Online. Banks have also 
become regular targets. 
 
Phishers use a number of different social engineering and e-mail spoofing ploys to try to trick 
their victims. In one fairly typical case before the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a 17-
year-old male sent out messages purporting to be from America Online that said there had 
been a billing problem with recipients' AOL accounts. The perpetrator's e-mail used AOL 
logos and contained legitimate links. If recipients clicked on the "AOL Billing Center" link, 
however, they were taken to a spoofed AOL Web page that asked for personal information, 
including credit card number, personal identification numbers (PINs), social security numbers, 
banking numbers, and passwords. This information was used for identity theft.17
 
• Misrepresentation 
Being told you have won a prize and to ‘call this phone number’ is often enough enticement. 
You dial the number which has an automated answer system while you listen to the 
information you are being charged at an exorbitant price for making the call. The (usually 
overseas) phone company has successfully deceived you and the additional bill arrives via 
your local telecom provider. 
 
• Deception – P2P 
A new way of extracting information has also surfaced on several dedicated Peer-to-Peer 
systems (e.g. Kazaa) that focuses on ‘wannabe hackers’ whose eagerness to misuse computers 
becomes a means of exploitation. So “if you want to be able to hack into Hotmail, download 
this package and run it on your PC”. The program doesn’t work and so the ‘would be’ hacker 
deletes it. However, when the program runs it installs a ‘keylogger’ (see below) on your PC to 
capture your keystrokes and this then sends the collected data to a hidden email address. This 
discloses your username and password to the perpetrator.  An alternative to installing a 
keylogger is to install a hidden ‘backdoor’; giving access to your PC by an intruder.  
 
Content Crime - Offensive Materials 
Content considered by some to be objectionable exists in abundance in cyberspace. This 
includes: pornography, child pornography (now an international criminal offence), online 
gaming/betting, treasonous or sacrilegious content, racist propaganda, and instructions for the 
fabrication of incendiary and explosive devices. The widespread availability of such material 
and the ease in which such obnoxious websites, even if detected and closed in the host 
jurisdiction, pop-up on the hosts of other (less legally developed) jurisdictions is now well 
understood. 
 
Espionage 
Industrial espionage and the gathering of classified government information, of use to a 
foreign power, are not new. The Internet with all its vulnerabilities means that any sensitive 
data at any level of society is under threat from criminals, corporate competitors and foreign 
intelligence services. Hacking into a computer to gather sensitive information can be achieved 
by using several types of malware (see below), capitalizing on social engineering and using 
                                                 
17 http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci916037,00.html 
19 
FINAL DRAFT 
‘password crackers’. The ability to guess a password is enhanced by utilizing an automated 
approach using a ‘dictionary attack’ program.  
 
In cryptanalysis and computer security, a dictionary attack is a technique for defeating a 
cipher or authentication mechanism by trying to determine its decryption key or pass-phrase 
by searching a large number of possibilities. In contrast with a brute force attack, where all 
possibilities are searched through exhaustively, a dictionary attack only tries possibilities 
which are most likely to succeed, typically derived from a list of words in a especially 
composed ‘dictionary’. Generally, dictionary attacks succeed because most people have a 
tendency to choose passwords which are easy to remember, and typically choose words taken 
from their native language18.  
 
Resource (Computers) Theft  
Whilst resource theft does not seem to be as common as it used to be, it still exists.  The 
illegal use of someone’s computer resources is often undetected. Quite apart from the loss of 
function, reduced memory, degradation of networks and the loss of hard-drive space, the theft 
of IT resources may cause severe embarrassment. In a recent case the second author 
discovered that a bank’s PC network provided a database of pornographic videos for world-
wide distribution. Issues like this, if released into the media, would have been very harmful to 
the organization’s reputation, resulting in a lack of confidence and the erosion of the bank’s 
customer base. 
 
CYBERCRIME SOFTWARE TOOLS 
 
Malware, or Malicious Code, is software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system, 
without the owner's consent. The term is a portmanteau of "mal-" (or perhaps "malicious") 
and "software", and describes the intent of the creator, rather than any particular features. 
Malware is commonly taken to include: 
 
• Computer Viruses 
• Worms 
• Trojan Horses 
• Spyware 
• Adware 
• Botnets 
• Rootkits 
 
In law, malware is sometimes known as a computer contaminant. Malware should not be 
confused with defective software, that is, software which has a legitimate purpose but 
contains errors or bugs.19
 
Computer Viruses 
A computer virus attaches itself to a program or file so it can spread from one computer to 
another, leaving infections as it travels. Much like human viruses, computer viruses can range 
in severity; some viruses cause only mildly annoying effects while others can damage your 
hardware, software, or files. Almost all viruses are attached to an executable file, which 
                                                 
18 See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary_attack 
19 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malware 
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means the virus may exist on your computer but it cannot infect your computer unless you run 
or open the malicious program. It is important to note that a virus cannot be spread without a 
human action, (such as running an infected program) to keep it going.  People continue the 
spread of a computer virus, mostly unknowingly, by sharing infecting files or sending e-mails 
with viruses as attachments in the e-mail.20  
 
Worms 
A worm is similar to a virus by its design, and is considered to be a sub-class of a virus. 
Worms spread from computer to computer, but unlike a virus, have the ability to travel 
without any help from a person. A worm takes advantage of file or the information transport 
features on your system, which allows it to travel unaided. The biggest danger with a worm is 
its ability to replicate itself on your system, so rather than your computer sending out a single 
worm, it could send out hundreds or thousands of copies of itself, creating a huge and 
devastating effect. One example would be for a worm to send a copy of itself to everyone 
listed in your e-mail address book. Then, the worm replicates and sends itself out to everyone 
listed in each of the receiver's address book, and the manifest continues on down the line. Due 
to the copying nature of a worm and its ability to travel across networks the end result in most 
cases is that the worm consumes too much system memory (or network bandwidth), causing 
Web servers, network servers, and individual computers to stop responding. In more recent 
worm attacks such as the much talked about Blaster Worm, the worm has been designed to 
tunnel into your system and allow malicious users to control your computer remotely.21  
 
Trojan Horses 
A Trojan Horse is full of as much trickery as the mythological Trojan Horse it was named 
after. The Trojan Horse, at first glance will appear to be useful software but will actually do 
damage once installed or run on your computer.  Those on the receiving end of a Trojan 
Horse are usually tricked into opening them because they appear to be receiving legitimate 
software or files from a legitimate source.  When a Trojan is activated on your computer, the 
results can vary. Some Trojans are designed to be more annoying than malicious (like 
changing your desktop, adding silly active desktop icons) or they can cause serious damage 
by deleting files and destroying information on your system. Trojans are also known to create 
a ‘backdoor’ on your computer that gives malicious users access to your system, possibly 
allowing confidential or personal information to be compromised. Unlike viruses and worms, 
Trojans do not reproduce by infecting other files nor do they self-replicate. 
 
Spyware  
In the field of computing, the term ‘Spyware’ refers to a broad category of malicious software 
designed to intercept or take partial control of a computer's operation without the informed 
consent of that machine's owner or legitimate user. While the term taken literally suggests 
software that surreptitiously monitors the user, it has come to refer more broadly to software 
that subverts the computer's operation for the benefit of a third party. 
 
In simpler terms, spyware is a type of program that watches what users do with their computer 
and then sends this information to a hacker over the Internet. Spyware can collect many 
different types of information about a user. More benign programs can attempt to track what 
                                                 
20 See http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2004/virus.asp 
21 See http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2004/virus.asp 
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types of websites a user visits and send this information to an advertisement agency. More 
malicious versions can try to record what a user types to try to intercept passwords or credit 
card numbers. Yet other versions simply launch popups with advertisements. 
 
Spyware differs from viruses and worms in that it does not usually self-replicate. Like many 
recent viruses, however, spyware – by design – exploits infected computers for commercial 
gain. Typical tactics furthering this goal include delivery of unsolicited pop-up 
advertisements; theft of personal information (including financial information such as credit 
card numbers); monitoring of Web-browsing activity for marketing purposes; or routing of 
HTTP requests to advertising sites. 
 
Adware 
Adware is software integrated into or bundled with a program. It is usually seen by the 
programmer as a way to recover programming development costs, and in some cases it may 
allow the program to be provided to the user free of charge or at a reduced price. The 
advertising income may allow or motivate the programmer to continue to write, maintain and 
upgrade the software product. 
 
Some adware is also shareware, and so the word may be used as term of distinction to 
differentiate between types of shareware software. What differentiates adware from other 
shareware is that it is primarily advertising-supported. Users may also be given the option to 
pay for a "registered" or "licensed" copy to do away with the advertisements. There are 
concerns about adware because it often takes is a form of spyware, in which information 
about the user's activity is tracked, reported, and often re-sold, typically without the 
knowledge or consent of the user. Of even greater concern is malware, which may interfere 
with the function of other software applications, in order to force users to visit a particular 
web site. 
 
It is not uncommon for people to confuse ‘adware’ with ‘spyware’ and ‘malware’, especially 
since these concepts overlap. For example, if one user installs ‘adware’ on a computer, and 
consents to a tracking feature, the adware becomes spyware when another user visits that 
computer, and interacts with and is tracked by the adware without their consent. 
 
Spyware has prompted complaints from computer security and privacy advocates, including 
the Electronic Privacy Information Centre. Often, spyware applications send the user's 
browsing habits to an ‘adserving’ company, which then targets adverts at the user based on 
their interests. Kazaa and eXeem are popular programs which incorporate software of this 
type. 
 
Adware programs other than spyware do not usually invisibly collect and upload the activity 
record or personal information of the user of the computer when he/she has not expected or 
approved of the transfer. However, some vendors of adware maintain that their application of 
this form of information collection is not spyware because of their disclosure of the program’s 
activities.  For example, a product vendor may indicate that since somewhere in the product's 
‘Terms of Use’ there is a clause that third-party software will be included that may collect and 
may report on computer use, that this form of ‘Terms of Use’ disclosure releases  the product 
from any liability and is merely adware22.  
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Keyloggers 
Keystroke logging (often called keylogging) is a diagnostic used in software development that 
captures the user's keystrokes. It can be useful to determine sources of error in computer 
systems. Such systems are also highly useful for law enforcement and espionage. For instance, 
providing a means to obtain passwords or encryption keys and thus bypassing other security 
measures. However, keyloggers are widely available on the Internet and can be used by 
anyone for these illegal purposes. 
 
Writing software applications for keylogging is trivial, and like any computer program can be 
distributed as a Trojan horse or as part of a virus or worm. What is not trivial however is the 
capability of installing a keystroke logger without getting caught and downloading data that 
has been logged without being traced by the countermeasures deployed to secure the 
computer. An attacker that manually connects to a host machine to download logged 
keystrokes risks being traced. A Trojan that sends keylogged data to a fixed e-mail address or 
IP address risks exposure of the attacker23. 
 
Botnet 
Botnet is jargon for a collection of software robots, or bots, which run autonomously. This 
can also refer to the network of computers using distributed computing software. While the 
term "botnet" can be used to refer to any group of bots, such as IRC bots, the word is 
generally used to refer to a collection of compromised machines running programs (usually 
referred to as worms, Trojan horses, or backdoors) under a common command and control 
infrastructure. A botnet's originator can control the group remotely, usually through means 
such as an IRC, and often for nefarious purposes. Individual programs manifest as IRC "bots". 
Often the command and control takes place via an IRC server or a specific channel on a 
public IRC network. A bot typically runs hidden, and complies with the RFC 1459 (IRC) 
standard. Generally, the perpetrator of the botnet has compromised a series of systems using 
various tools (exploits, buffer overflows, as well as others; see also Remote Program Calls 
[RPC]). Newer bots can automatically scan their environment and propagate themselves using 
vulnerabilities and weak passwords. Generally, the more vulnerability a bot can scan and 
propagate through, the more valuable it becomes to a botnet owner community. 
 
Botnets have become a significant part of the Internet, albeit increasingly hidden. Because 
most conventional IRC networks now take measures to block access to previously-hosted 
botnets, owners must now find their own servers. Often, a botnet will include a variety of 
connections, ranging from dial-up, DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), cable, educational, and 
corporate levels. Sometimes, a botnet owner will hide an IRC server installation on an 
educational or corporate site, where high-speed connections can support a large number of 
other bots. Exploitation of this method of using a bot to host other bots has proliferated 
recently, as most script kiddies do not have the knowledge to take advantage of it. Several 
botnets have been found and removed from the Internet. The Dutch police found a 1.5 million 
node botnet and the Norwegian ISP Telenor disbanded a 10,000 node botnet. Large 
coordinated international efforts to shutdown botnets have also been initiated.24
  
                                                 
23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keystroke_logging 
24 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet 
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Rootkits 
A ‘Rootkit’ is a set of software tools frequently used by a third party (usually an intruder) 
after gaining access to a computer system. These tools are intended to conceal running 
processes, files or system data, which helps an intruder maintain access to a system without 
the user's knowledge. Rootkits are known to exist for a variety of operating systems such as 
Linux, Solaris and versions of Microsoft Windows. A computer with a rootkit on it is called, 
not surprisingly, a ’rooted computer’. The word "rootkit" came to public awareness in the 
2005 Sony CD copy protection controversy, in which Sony BMG music CDs surreptitiously 
placed a rootkit on Microsoft Windows PCs when their CDs were played on the computer. 
Sony provided did not disclose this on the CD or its packaging, referring only to security and 
intellectual property rights management measures. This form of digital IP rights protection 
generated considerable controversy about disclosure and privacy.25
 
A rootkit is often used to hide utilities used to abuse a compromised system. These often 
include so-called "backdoors" to help the attacker subsequently access the system more easily. 
For example, the rootkit may hide an application that spawns a shell when the attacker 
connects to a particular network port on the system. Kernel rootkits may include similar 
functionality. A backdoor may also allow processes started by a non-privileged user to 
execute functions normally reserved for the superuser. All sorts of other tools useful for abuse 
can be hidden using rootkits. This includes tools for further attacks against computer systems 
the compromised system communicates with such as sniffers and keyloggers. A common 
abuse is to use a compromised computer as a staging ground for further abuse. This is often 
done to make the abuse appear to originate from the compromised system or network instead 
of the attacker. This can include denial-of-service attack tools, tools to manipulate relay chat 
sessions, and e-mail spam attacks. A major use for rootkits is allowing the programmer of the 
rootkit to see and access user names and log-in information for sites that require them. The 
programmer of the rootkit can store unique sets of log-in information from many different 
computers. This makes the rootkits extremely hazardous, as it allows trojans to access this 
personal information while the rootkit covers it up. 
 
SHIFTS IN CYBERCRIME: THE NEXT WAVE AND FUTURE PROBLEMS 
 
In order to make key resource decisions (e.g. training, investigations, public education) we 
need to predict the likely trajectory of future cyber criminal activities. We do this in the vain 
hope that we may not fall too far behind increasingly ‘tech savvy’ criminals and delinquent 
professionals too easily seduced by the abundance of opportunities for crime on the Internet 
and other ICT platforms. To be able to stay one step ahead of cyber crime is at present a 
fantasy. New operating systems and newly re-engineered “Internets” are on the horizon but 
the cross-national and celerity of many cyber crimes render many offences beyond the reach 
of enforcement. 
 
We suggest the next wave of security threats will be targeted attacks aimed at specific 
organisations or individuals within enterprises. A particular household may be targeted as a 
vector to support intrusions of more valuable targets. Thus prevention of at both the 
household and business levels remain of equal importance. This is not to say that the days of 
mass e-mail attacks such as the blaster worm, which led to denial of service attacks that 
shutdown networks, are gone. They are not, and many of the intrusions, including spyware 
                                                 
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit 
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such as key loggers, will be used in this new round of attacks.  So, in addition to the old 
threats new attacks will comprise a menace with the potential to cause damage to enterprise 
networks.  These attacks will come from people, not just with programming experience but 
with business and systems (process) experience.  Thus there is a significant shift in offender 
focus. We predict that more attacks will aim to target specific businesses and specific systems 
internal to those businesses. Cyber criminals will probe for weak and poorly or unguarded 
computer networks within commercial organizations whose ability to detect and respond to 
fraud or other thefts is slow, imprecise and limited. 
 
In addition the vulnerabilities in voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) systems will pose new 
problems for ICT personnel and law enforcement. These guardians will be less able to log or 
intercept VoIP. The convenience of VoIP will readily attract a significant proportion of 
Internet users including those who see the greater anonymity offered by this format. The 
widespread use of ‘key loggers’ and ‘hardware hacks’ will present persistent challenges to 
network administrators and users.  Add wireless and cell phone viruses to the mix, within the 
context of the innumerable service bottlenecks now emerging, which facilitate new spam 
based DoS attacks and wider opportunities to deploy spyware. 
 
Organisations in the financial services industries will be targeted more heavily than others 
with financial gain, the ultimate goal.  One of the indicators of this change is evident in the 
discussions at the Hacker conventions and Hacker chat channels.  In the past hackers would 
talk about how or where they were going to break-in to a system.  Now, they talk about what 
they going to do or what they can do once they're inside. 
 
So the next generation of threat consists of targeted attacks, and the switch from client to 
server vulnerabilities.  The rise in targeted attacks in the past year shows that the trend is now 
away from mass distributed attacks that blindly assault any computer connected to the Internet.  
These new threats, which carefully target single corporate networks, are becoming more 
profitable for cyber criminals and increasingly costly, if not fatal, to business. They result not 
only in the loss of millions of dollars but also in the lost trust of their customers.  One of the 
driving forces behind the increases in targeted attacks has been the commitment from major 
software vendors like Microsoft to develop more secure applications and release update 
patches more frequently.  This has significantly decreased the success rate of many mass 
distributed (DoS) attacks. These were thwarted at the applications vulnerabilities level. 
Although we still need to know more about the update patch behaviour of businesses and 
households. As traditional cybercrime techniques evolve and are combined, we expect to see 
targeted attacks on specific industries or businesses increase at an alarming rate. 
 
The second key reason for the rise in targeted attacks is improved level of awareness and 
sophistication among targeted enterprises, which manifests in more advanced defence 
strategies.  This in turn, limits the potential impact of mass distributed attacks, so the ‘Black 
Caps’ or delinquent code writers look for new vehicles and approaches now switch to client 
side vulnerabilities.  The most recent scams showed the risk in the business enterprise 
environment had moved beyond Windows and UNIX vulnerabilities.  This trend will also 
show an increased emphasis on computer applications per se as well as hardware: a recent 
example was the ‘Santy’ worm which attacked an open source bulletin board26. 
 
                                                 
26 See http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2004/12/21/santy_worm_spreads_through_phpbb_forums.html. 
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Security products such as antivirus firewalls and VPN products will increasingly become a 
security challenge themselves in 2006. It has been suggested that 70% of malicious software 
circulated on the Internet is linked to various types of cybercrime. Financial profit has become 
a priority for creators of malware and these now operate as single or compound formats 
including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, and the like. 
 
As we have seen in many Hollywood films the first thing that every attacker seeks to do is to 
disable security and alarm systems.  Once those security systems are disabled attacks becomes 
significantly more capable of attempt to repel.  Therefore, exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
security infrastructure leaves you significantly vulnerable to further attacks. Speedy 
identification and responses are crucial and remain the first line of defence. It's not just a case 
of recognising what types of attack exist, but we also need to recognise the best way to 
counter those attacks.  It is through the development of on line training forums and research 
networks that we can keep abreast of cybercrime developments. The rapid transfer of news 
and countermeasures will be crucial. 
 
Recent developments in the general context of more data, places, customers and complexity 
suggested likely priorities as follows: 
 
• Accounting for changes in the form (i.e. greater sophistication) and profit focus of 
criminal activity, especially fraud and deception-like offences (see Morris 2004). Carding 
is now at a scale that requires urgent and effective attention. 
• The scope, prevalence, severity, and duration of cyber-crimes among different populations 
and how best to identify high-risk populations requires systematic attention. 
• Understanding the role of organised crime and, the overlap between traditional organized 
crime and new modes of crime facilitated by computers and Internet connectivity (see 
Council of Europe 2004, Brenner 2002). Notably the use of peer to peer specialist 
‘hacker’ chat rooms and the deviant networks these engender. 
• Increases in the virulence and sophistication of malicious code now require the best 
mechanisms for the co-ordination of rapid and secure information sharing about such 
threats among CERTs. 
• The nature and efficiency of private sector investments in security as an aspect of ‘true’ 
external costs (Schneier 2003). The role generally of the private sector and the ICT 
security sector to acknowledge the link between business risk and household computer 
vulnerability. 
• The effectiveness and efficiency of civil law deterrents and the role of government 
requires the attention of policy research (Grabosky et al. 2001). 
• Despite increased cross-national cooperation, systematic evaluation of the progress made 
in developing comprehensive forms of MLA has yet to occur. Action is necessary to map 
the ‘density’ of these relationships (including intelligence-sharing networks) and assay the 
effectiveness of MLA in closing the gaps in the international legal system. The 
monitoring of compliance is now a priority (Kaspersen 2004). 
• Observing trends in public confidence in e-commerce over time in one country is 
important and could be conducted on a cross-national comparative basis. Comparing 
findings relating to public confidence with actual levels of e-commerce can also be useful 
(Grabosky & Broadhurst 2005). 
• The parlous state of some law enforcement agencies and the consequent risk of cyber-
crime safe havens required the attention of development economics and cross-cultural 
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specialists27. 
 
Much of what we think will help in preventing cyber-crime is based on too little knowledge 
about offender and victim behaviour as it applies in the online environment (Broadhurst 2005). 
Some of these information gaps are now being addressed but further development based on a 
clear and functional classification of computer crimes is essential. To guide both training and 
research a number of cross-disciplinary applied and theoretical approaches will need to be 
tested. Along with these essential processes must be a greater willingness to test and re-test 
software and hardware defences as well as the best forms of general and specific forms of 
public/private partnerships in cyberspace crime prevention. 
 
Cyber-crime prevention is an intimate requirement in critical information infrastructure 
protection; and whilst we seem to consider that there are distinct differences between 
organised crime and terrorists, it now seems that there is a blurring of our perceptions. Most 
terrorist activity is organised and nearly always criminal (Grabosky 2007). This places the 
threats to our critical information infrastructure from a wide range of perpetrators. It is 
imperative that we secure the complete scope of our dependence on ICT. Future attacks are 
always directed at the ‘weakest link’. Current indications suggest that the financial 
infrastructure is the primary focus of criminals; and, any part of our infrastructure that can be 
disrupted for maximum political effect is likely to be exploited by terrorists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27Priorities adapted from Broadhurst (2005). 
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